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Abstract: 
Experimental results from student or other non-representative convenience samples often 
suggest that men, on average, are more risk-taking and competitive than women. Here we 
explore whether these gender preference gaps also exist in a simple random sample of the 
Swedish adult population. Our design comprises four different treatments to systematically 
explore how the experimental context may impact gender gaps; a baseline treatment, a treatment 
where participants are primed with their own gender, and a treatment where the participants 
know the gender of their counterpart (man or woman). We look at willingness to compete in 
two domains: a math task and a verbal task. We find no gender differences in risk preferences 
or in willingness to compete in the verbal task in this random sample. There is some support 
for men being more competitive than women in the math task, in particular in the pooled 
sample. The effect size is however considerably smaller than what is typically found. We further 
find no consistent impact of treatment on (the absence of) the gender gap in preferences.  
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1. Introduction 
Gender differences in economic preferences have been put forward as a potential explanation 
to gender gaps observed in educational choices and labor market outcomes (e.g. Croson and 
Gneezy 2009; Bertrand 2011). In particular, substantial attention has been given to gender 
differences in risk preferences and competitiveness, where the experimental literature from both 
the lab and the field suggests that, if anything, men tend to be more risk-taking and competitive 
than women (e.g. Eckel and Grossman 2008a, 2008b; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Bertrand 2011; 
Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Niederle 2014)  
Experimental measures of risk preferences and competitiveness have been shown to relate to 
important economic choices and outcomes. These preferences seem to play a role in explaining 
individual outcomes as well as gender differences in outcomes. For example, studies by Bonin 
et al. (2007) and Dohmen et al. (2011) indicate that risk-averse individuals are more likely to 
work in sectors with little salary variation and less likely to be self-employed. On 
competitiveness, Zhang (2013) finds that students who are willing to compete in a math task in 
the lab are more likely to take a competitive high school entrance exam in China than 
uncompetitive individuals. In a similar vein, Buser et al. (2014) find that competitive 
individuals choose more math oriented and prestigious high school tracks in the Netherlands 
and that the gender gap in willingness to compete partially explains the gender gap in the choice 
of educational specialization. Buser et al. (2017) find similar results exploring the choice of 
specialization among students in Swiss academic high schools. Further, Reubenet al. (2017) 
find that competitive college students have higher expectations for their future salaries. In a 
large field experiment, Flory et al. (2015) also find that women are in some, but not most, 
contexts less likely to apply for jobs with competitive payment schemes than men. The 
experimental results on gender preference gaps thus largely support the observation that these 
gaps may have important economic consequences and contribute to gender differences in 
economic outcomes.  
In this study, we test whether there are gender differences in risk preferences and willingness 
to compete in a random sample of the Swedish population aged 18-73. While the existence of 
gender preference gaps has been replicated in experimental studies in different countries using 
different types of samples, it is also clear that the existence and strength of gender gaps vary 
with the context such as the social framing or the gender composition of the reference group, 
the exact measurement used, and the specific population studied (e.g. Gneezyet al. 2003; 
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Croson and Gneezy 2009; Dreber et al. 2011; Booth and Nolen 2012a, 2012b; Cárdenas et al. 
2012; Gong and Yang 2012; Datta Gupta et al. 2013; Apicella and Dreber 2015; Filippin and 
Crosetto 2016).  
We contribute to this literature by exploring gender gaps in risk preferences and willingness to 
compete in a randomly drawn and representative sample which minimizes many of the selection 
issues that could be relevant in other samples. We further systematically vary the decision 
context across four treatments to explore if gender gaps in risk preferences and willingness to 
compete depend on the social context and gender salience. In a first condition, the Baseline 
treatment, participants make decisions anonymously. This treatment is close to the setting used 
in most laboratory experiments. In the Priming treatment, participants are in a subtle way 
reminded of their own gender before they make any decisions in the experiment. We 
hypothesize that the prime will make behavior more gender stereotypical than in the control 
condition, i.e. that the potential gender gap in risk preferences and competitiveness increases. 
However, our hypothesis is silent on how this increase would occur.6 Moreover, the only other 
study on gender priming and risk preferences find no effect (Benjamin et al. 2010).7  
We further include two treatments where participants are informed about the gender of their 
counterpart before each decision; these are the Male Counterpart and the Female Counterpart 
treatments. Previous results on whether the gender of the opponent matters for competitive 
decisions are mixed. For example, Cardenas et al. (2012) find that girls in Colombia compete 
more against other girls, whereas Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) find that girls in Israel compete 
less against other girls. Datta Gupta et al. (2013) is the only study so far randomizing the gender 
of the counterpart, and they find that men compete more against women than against men. We 
hypothesize, as in the priming treatment, that the gendered behaviors will be more pronounced 
in these treatments compared to the baseline treatment. As for the priming treatment, our 
hypothesis is silent on whether men or women, or both, are impacted by the treatment.    
                                               
6 Some studies show that both men and women’s behavior react to variations of the decision context  (e.g. Gneezy 
et al. 2003; Ellingsen et al. 2012, 2013; Boschini et al. 2012). However, changes in behavior often occur in the 
direction predicted by gender stereotypes (Espinosa and Kovářík 2015).  
7 Exposure to same- or mixed-sex groups could potentially have priming-related effects and could thus influence 
risk preferences and competitiveness. The results from Booth and Nolen (2012a; 2012b) suggest that girls from 
same-sex schools are more willing to compete, as well as more risk-taking, than girls from mixed-sex schools. 
Similar results are also reported in a study where first year college students were randomly allocated to all male, 
all female or coeducational groups (Booth et al. 2014). After eight weeks in a same-sex environment, women are 
significantly more risk taking than their counterparts in mixed-sex groups. The exact mechanism behind these 
results remains to be explored, but priming could potentially be involved. 
 
 
3 
 
Finally, we study competitiveness in two different tasks that vary in gender stereotypes: a math 
task and a verbal task. Some studies show that the competitive task may matter for the gender 
gap in willingness to compete. While boys or men are often found to be more competitive than 
girls or women in math-related tasks there is typically no gender gap in verbal tasks (e.g. 
Günther et al. 2010; Grosse et al.2014; Shurchkov 2012; Dreber et al. 2014; though Wozniak 
et al. 2014 find that men are more competitive also in a verbal task). We thus hypothesize that 
the typical gender gap, with men being more competitive than women, will be observed in the 
math task but not in the verbal task in all treatments.  
The study was conducted using phone interviews. Our sample consists of about 1,000 
individuals, making it relatively large compared to most other experimental studies on gender 
differences in preferences. In addition to the economic choice tasks we also collected basic 
socio-demographic information, such as age, income, and level of education, about the 
participants.  
To preview our results, despite using a multiple price list with a safe option to elicit risk 
preferences, which normally produce larger gender gaps (Crosetto and Filippin 2017), we find 
no overall gender differences in risk preferences. We also do not find any gender difference in 
willingness to compete in the verbal task. Our results suggest that men are more competitive 
than women in the math task in particular in the pooled sample. However, the effect size is 
considerably lower than what is typically found among students. In addition, we do not find 
any behavioral differences in willingness to compete in the math task (or the verbal task) 
between the baseline and the three other treatments, neither in general nor for each gender 
separately. A post power analysis presented in section 3.4 suggests that the overall null results 
found are not due to lack of statistical power. However, to what extent our results for the 
Swedish population can be generalized to random samples in other countries remains to be 
explored. 
Only a handful of studies explore gender preference gaps among representative samples of a 
country population, and with sometimes mixed results. Representativeness in these studies is 
typically assessed by comparing the general population to the sample at hand along a few key 
variables. The studies differ in sampling methods, using either probabilistic sampling methods, 
such as simple random samples, where the inclusion probability is known, or non-probabilistic 
sampling methods, where the inclusion probability is unknown.  
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Harrison et al. (2007) use the Holt and Laury task to elicit risk preferences in a random sample 
of the Danish population aged 19 to 75 (253 individuals, 40% response rate). They find no 
gender difference, and the lack of gender gap is not influenced by the inclusion of some socio-
economic variables. Dohmen et al. (2010) and Dohmen et al. (2011) study two different random 
samples of German adults (1012 and 22019 individuals respectively, overall response rates are 
not reported). Using incentivized and un-incentivized risk measures, Dohmen et al. (2010) find 
no gender gaps in risk-taking. Dohmen et al. (2011), on the other hand, find that women, on 
average, self-report to be less willing to take risks. However, this gap is not confirmed among 
participants answering the incentivized task. Using the same self-reported measure as in 
Dohmen et al. (2011), Almenberg and Dreber (2015) also find that men are, on average, more 
risk-taking than women in a random sample of Swedish adults (1,300 individuals, 45% response 
rate). von Gaudecker et al. (2011), using both hypothetical and incentivized measures on a 
Dutch sample (using the CentER internet panel), find that women on average are less risk-
taking than men (1422 participants).8 Beauchamp et al. (2017) use a random sample 
(approximately 11,000 individuals) of the Swedish twin population (the sample of twins is 
similar to the general population on some selected characteristics). Also using the non-
incentivized risk measure mentioned above, they find that male twins on average are more risk-
taking than female twins (only looking at same-sex twins). Two recent papers use the non-
incentivized risk question on country populations. Falk et al. (2017) study random samples of 
households in 76 countries and find women to be significantly more risk-averse than men at 
least at the 10% significance level in 82% of the countries. Sephavand and Shahbazian (2017) 
study the same risk question in a stratified (by region) random sample from Burkina Faso, also 
finding women to be less risk-taking compared to men.  
To our knowledge, there are no other studies on willingness to compete in a representative 
sample. Instead, the most related studies are Almås et al. (2015) and Buser et al. (2017), which 
both elicit willingness to compete in a math task. Almås et al. (2015) study competitiveness in 
a sample of 523 14-15 year-olds in Bergen, a city which is roughly comparable to the rest of 
the Norwegian population. They find that family background matters in explaining gender 
differences in willingness to compete, where the gender gap is higher among individuals with 
a high socio-economic background as compared to low. Buser et al. (2017) use a sample of 249 
students from a region in Switzerland. Their sample is similar to the regional population 
                                               
8  The recruitment for the CentERpanel is conducted by TNS-NIPO. Households complete an internet based survey 
every week. When a household leaves the panel it is replaced with another household with similar characteristics. 
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concerning the share of women. They find that women are less competitive and that 
competitiveness can partly explain the gender gap in study choice.  
In sum, the results from representative samples in different countries suggest that men self-
report to be more risk-taking in almost all studies, whereas there is not always a gender 
difference with incentivized measures. When it comes to willingness to compete there are no 
previous studies using priming. However, two studies using samples that are similar to larger 
country or regional populations suggest that women are less willing to compete than men, at 
least in math-related tasks.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our experimental 
design and data. In section 3 we present the results from each treatment separately as well as a 
potential treatment effects. Finally, in section 4 we discuss our results in comparison with 
previous literature and then conclude. 
 
2. Experimental design and data 
We conduct an artefactual field experiment (following the definition of Harrison and List 2004) 
on a simple random sample of the Swedish population aged 17-83. The sampling was performed 
in close collaboration with a professional polling company based in Stockholm, Sweden, with 
the main sampling and data collection performed in September through November 2011 and 
additional follow-up collection of income and education data in October 2012. The polling 
company received a random sample of the Swedish population from Statistics Sweden and 
collected the data through telephone interviews.9 The polling company then provided us with 
anonymized data.10  
2.1 Setup and treatments 
Sampled individuals received a letter a few days ahead of the first phone call inviting them to 
take part in a phone interview study on economic decision-making conducted by researchers at 
Stockholm University. The letter provided information on the length of the study 
                                               
9 The polling company (MIND Research) conducted the inverviews according to the standards of Statistics 
Sweden. The length of an interview was maximum 30 minutes. Up to 14 attempts to reach each individual in the 
sample were made, and all interviews and attempts to contact participants were conducted in the afternoon and 
evening during normal working days.  
10 An application to the Stockholm Ethical Review Board (Etikprövningsnämnden i Stockholm: EPN) for the 
present project was submitted in June, 2011. EPN stated that our project did not need to undergo full ethical review 
since we only handle anonymized information. 
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(approximately 30 minutes) and earnings (A SEK 100 participation fee plus potentially more 
depending on the participant’s choices).11 In the interview, each participant made decisions in 
eight independent situations and answered demographic questions. The eight decisions included 
the following measures and games: the dictator game (in the role of the dictator), the ultimatum 
game (in the role of the proposer), the trust game (in the role of the trustor), the prisoner’s 
dilemma, the battle of the sexes, risk preferences, and willingness to compete in a math task 
and willingness to compete in  a verbal task.12 In this paper, we focus on risk preferences and 
willingness to compete (Results for the dictator game are reported in Boschini et al. 2018, and 
the other results will be reported elsewhere.). 
For all decisions, an interviewer read the instructions to the participant.13 Before each decision, 
participants answered some control questions allowing us to measure participants’ 
understanding of each decision (no control questions were used for the part measuring risk 
preferences). Participants received no feedback on outcomes during the experiment.  
Participants in the phone interview were randomly assigned to one of four treatments; Baseline, 
priming, female counterpart or male counterpart. In the baseline treatment, the interaction was 
fully anonymous for the participants vis-à-vis each other, and no reference was made to 
gender.14 In the priming treatment, participants were asked to state their gender at the beginning 
of the interview. Finally, in the female and male counterpart treatments, the gender of the 
counterpart was revealed, and this information was repeated and kept constant for each decision 
involving a counterpart.  
All decision situations were presented to the participants in standard language. Participants 
were informed that one of the eight decisions would be randomly chosen for payment by the 
decision(s) made by the participants involved. If the risk decision was selected for payment, 
one out of the seven risk decisions was randomly chosen for payment. 
2.2 Experimental measures and demographic questions 
We elicit risk preferences by using a multiple price list where participants make seven choices 
between a risky option and a safe option. The risky option was the same across the different 
                                               
11 At the time of the study, SEK 100 was approximately USD 14. 
12 We used a postal survey for participants who were recipients in the Dictator Game, proposers in the Ultimatum 
Game and second players in the Trust Game. 
13 In order to minimize the individual differences between the interviews we conducted a pilot were we listened in 
on a few interviews.  
14 Unlike in a standard lab experiment, participants are however not anonymous vis-à-vis the interviewer. 
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decisions, giving SEK 200 or 0 with equal probability, while the safe options varied from SEK 
40 to SEK 160 in increments of 20 SEK. We measure risk preferences from the number of times 
the participant chose the risky option.  
We measure willingness to compete as the binary decision to compete or not in two different 
tasks: a verbal and a math task.  Participants first decided whether to compete in a verbal task 
and then in a math task. The choices in these two tasks allow us to compare the gender gap in 
willingness to compete in a verbal task with a neutral or potentially female stereotype and a 
math task with an implicit male stereotype.15 In the verbal task, participants were asked to form 
as many words as possible of at least three letters from eight given letters during two minutes. 
In the math task, participants were asked to find as many number combinations as possible that 
added up to 25 from nine given numbers, also during two minutes. After the task was described 
to them but before performing the task, participants chose their preferred payment form – an 
individual piece-rate payment or a competitive tournament payment. In our individual payment 
scheme, participants were paid SEK 10 per correct word or number sequence. The tournament 
payment scheme involved comparison with a randomly selected counterpart (who also chose 
to compete). The best performer was paid SEK 20 for each correctly solved exercise, and 
otherwise, they were paid SEK 0.  
Finally, we asked the participants a set of socio-demographic questions. In particular, we asked 
for age, legal gender, income, and education (Table 1 below describes our variables and show 
descriptive statistics of our sample). These variables are included since some previous work has 
indicated that they may correlate with gender differences in preferences.16 In research on survey 
methods characteristics of the interviewer are sometimes found to affect the answers. We, 
therefore, collected information on the gender of the interviewer.   
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  N Mean Sd Min Max 
Outcome variables           
Number of risky choices 997 3.520 2.240 0 7 
                                               
15 See, for example, Nosek et al. (2002) and Steffens et al. (2010) who investigate tasks and implicit gender 
stereotypes.  
16 Other socio-demographic measures we elicited, but do not use in the analysis of this paper, were: civil status, 
number of children below age 18, household income, occupation, occupational sector, and the position within the 
workplace. Including these variables in the current analysis does not change our result in a qualitative way.  
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Share of competition in word task 997 0.380 0.486 0 1 
Share of competition in math task 997 0.282 0.450 0 1 
Control variables           
Female (1=female, 0 otherwise) 997 0.488 0.500 0 1 
Age (years at time of interview)* 994 45.516 15.758 18 74 
Income (3 categories)** 953 2.848 1.272 1 7 
Education (4 categories)*** 989 3.247 0.810 1 4 
Gender of the interviewer (1=female, 0 
otherwise) 975 0.401 0.490 0 1 
* Since we only have information on birth year we have defined age as the year the study was conducted deducted by the 
birth year. We thus assume that all individuals are born on the 1st of January and the sample will, therefore, include some 
individuals that are 74 years old. 
**Low income=0-250000, Middle income=250001-750000, High income=750001- 
*** Low education=0-9 years, Middle education=10-12 years, High education=<12 years 
 
2.2 Data 
Our data set comprises the 997 individuals that completed the phone interview. The response 
rate was 52.9%, and there is no evidence of systematic non-response based on gender and age 
(see Table A1 and A2 in Appendix).17 Table 2 presents the number of observations in each 
treatment. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Treatment n Percent 
    
Baseline 269 26.98 
Priming 256 25.68 
Male counterpart 218 21.87 
Female counterpart 254 25.48 
    
Total 997 100.00 
 
Our sample can be considered representative of the Swedish population; it compares well to the 
population concerning gender, income and education, but consists, on average, of somewhat 
                                               
17 These response rates are comparable to standard surveys conducted by Statistics Sweden (www.scb.se). 
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older participants than the population (see Table A3 in Appendix).18 A comparison across 
treatments also reveal no statistical differences in socio-demographic characteristics among the 
participants in different treatment groups (see Table A4 in Appendix). The instructions that 
were read to the participants can be found in the appendix. 
 
3. Results 
We first explore gender gaps in risk-taking and willingness to compete within treatments and 
in the pooled sample. After that we turn to treatment effects before we present a robustness 
analysis. Throughout the analysis, we use parametric tests: t-tests and OLS regression analyses 
for the cardinal risk variable, and test of proportions and Logit regression for the dichotomous 
competition variable. The significance level we employ is 0.05. To simplify future meta-
analyses, we also report effect sizes (Cohen’s d). In the regression analyses, we control for the 
following socio-demographic variables: income, age, age squared, highest obtained educational 
level, income level and gender of the interviewer. To be able to compare across regressions we 
keep the sample constant, restricting the analysis to include only individuals that provided an 
answer to all the socio-demographic variables. The restricted sample includes 71 individuals 
less compared to the sample on which the Cohen’s d calculations are based.    
3.1 Risk preferences 
Contrary to most previous studies employing a risk task with a safe option (Filippin and 
Crosetto 2017), we find no evidence of a gender gap in risk preferences in our sample. In the 
baseline treatment, both men and women choose, on average, 3.6 risky choices out of seven 
possible (Cohen’s d=0.026, p=0.834). In the priming treatment, men choose on average 3.2 
risky choices and women 3.3 risky choices (Cohen’s d=-0.05, p=0.710). The equivalent 
numbers for the treatment with a female counterpart are 3.8 and 3.6 (Cohen’s d=0.08, p=0.567) 
and for the treatment with a male counterpart, the numbers are 3.5 and 3.7 (Cohen’s d=-0.06, 
p=0.649). Pooling across all treatments, we find that both men and women choose an average 
of 3.5 risky decisions (Cohen’s d=-0.005 and p=0.933).  
                                               
18 Since our random sample seems to be fairly representative of the population we do not consider population 
weights necessary.  
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Bars denote 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 1. Number of risky choices by men and women  
Table 3 further explores any potential gender gap in risk preferences using OLS regressions. 
For each of the four different treatments, and the pooled sample, we run one regression 
controlling only for whether the participant is female or not, and one also controlling for socio-
demographic variables.  
The regression results are similar to the results from the t-tests presented above – we find no 
gender gaps in risk-taking in any of the treatments, or in the pooled sample. Further, including 
control variables do not change these results. 
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Table 3. The Gender Gap in Risky Choices 
OLS: Gender differences in number of risky choices within treatments. 
  Baseline Priming Male counterpart Female counterpart Pooled 
Female 0.026 0.070 0.200 0.426 -0.168 -0.207 0.129 0.278 0.052 0.134 
 (0.271) (0.277) (0.300) (0.318) (0.318) (0.319) (0.290) (0.303) (0.147) (0.152)            
Age  -0.013  0.147*  0.159*  0.003  0.069* 
  (0.060)  (0.066)  (0.070)  (0.062)  (0.032) 
           
Income  0.267*  0.264  0.043  0.164  0.180** 
  (0.126)  (0.139)  (0.145)  (0.118)  (0.066)            
Education  0.032  -0.204  -0.181  -0.380  -0.172 
  (0.193)  (0.221)  (0.241)  (0.240)  (0.112)            
Age squared  -0.000  -0.002*  -0.002*  -0.000  -0.001* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)            
Gender of the 
interviewer 
 -0.265  -0.272  -0.634  -0.334  -0.372* 
  (0.277)  (0.295)  (0.328)  (0.289)  (0.146) 
           
Constant 3.581*** 3.413** 3.090*** 0.479 3.770*** 1.384 3.520*** 4.333*** 3.480*** 2.505*** 
  (0.177) (1.162) (0.203) (1.372) (0.211) (1.333) (0.201) (1.247) (0.099) (0.633) 
Adjusted R2 -0.004 0.008 -0.002 0.054 -0.004 0.018 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.023 
Observations 248 248 239 239 203 203 236 236 926 926 
Robust standard errors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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3.2 Willingness to compete 
Figure 2 presents the raw shares of men and women willing to compete in the two tasks.19  In 
the verbal task, exploring each treatment separately, we find no statistically significant gender 
differences in willingness to compete. In the baseline group, 39% of men and 38% of women 
choose to compete (Cohen’s d=0.03, p=0.828). Equivalent numbers for the other treatments are 
36% vs 43% (Cohen’s d =-0.13, p=0.297) in the priming treatment, 34% vs 43% (Cohen’s d=-
0.19, p=0.158) in the male counterpart treatment and 35% vs 37% (Cohen’s d=-0.05, p=0.680) 
in the female counterpart treatment. Pooling all four treatments, we find that 36% of men vs 
40% of women choose to compete; again this difference is not significant (Cohen’s d=-0.08, 
p=0.198). 
 
Bars denote 95% confidence intervals. 
                                               
19 With respect to competitiveness, the participants answered a control question before each of the respective 
competitive measure began. In the main analyses, we include all participants, and as a robustness check presented 
in Section 3.4, we exclude those that did not answer the respective control question correctly (see Table A6 and 
A7). 
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Figure 2. Willingness to compete in the verbal and math task by men and women 
The point estimates of the gender gap in the math task are reversed in comparison to the verbal 
task, and the magnitudes are slightly larger. However, contrary to most previous studies, also 
this gap is not consistently significant. In the baseline treatment, 29% of men and 23% of 
women choose to compete (Cohen’s d=0.14, p=0.268). The equivalent numbers in the priming 
treatment and the male counterpart treatment are 33% vs 25% (Cohen’s d=0.17, p=0.182), and 
30% vs 23% (Cohen’s d=0.17, p=0.180) respectively. When the counterpart is a woman, we 
find that 38% of men vs 25% of women choose to compete. This difference is statistically 
significant (Cohen’s d=0.28, p=0.040). Pooling all four treatments also yields a statistically 
significant gender gap – among all participants 32% of men vs 24% of women choose to 
compete in the math task (Cohen’s d=0.18, p=0.004). 
Tables 4 and 5 display marginal effects from logit regressions for both measures of willingness 
to compete. Results are first presented for each treatment separately, and then for the pooled 
dataset, without and with control variables. The regression analyses confirm previous results 
with two exceptions. First, there is a significant gender difference in the math task in the 
treatment with a male counterpart, but it becomes non-significant when adding control 
variables. Second, the gender gap in the math task in the treatment with a female counterpart is 
no longer significant in the regression. The gender gap found when we pool the treatments 
decreases when adding socio-demographic controls. These results thus suggest that, if anything, 
there is a small gender gap in willingness to compete in Sweden in the math task and it is 
possibly related to socio-demographic characteristics.  
It is not the purpose of this study, but little evidence exist on the extent to which behavioral 
gender gaps are influenced by sociodemographic characteristics. Since our study is one of the 
largest studies exploring gender gaps in preferences, and we also collect information about 
participant´s sociodemographic characteristics, we briefly explore whether sociodemographics 
correlate with how men and women behave in Table A8. The main finding is that a higher 
income is correlated with an increase in both risk-taking and competitive behavior among 
women. The effect is significant and economically meaningful.    
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Table 4. The Gender Gap in Willingness to Compete in the Verbal Task 
Logit (marginal effects): Gender differences in the proportion of competitive choices in the verbal task. 
  Baseline Priming Male counterpart Female counterpart Pooled 
                      
Female -0.162 -0.025 0.174 0.188 0.370 0.477 0.114 0.179 0.113 0.172 
 (0.263) (0.279) (0.265) (0.280) (0.291) (0.312) (0.271) (0.290) (0.135) (0.140) 
           
Age  -0.195**  -0.027  -0.036  0.041  -0.047 
  (0.064)  (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.060)  (0.031) 
           
Income  0.442**  0.011  0.137  0.216  0.168** 
  (0.154)  (0.127)  (0.136)  (0.122)  (0.064) 
           
Education  0.029  0.264  0.356  0.096  0.176 
  (0.193)  (0.179)  (0.226)  (0.219)  (0.098) 
           
Age squared  0.002**  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
           
Gender of 
the 
interviewer 
 0.064  -0.138  0.127  0.343  0.092 
  (0.277)  (0.276)  (0.307)  (0.281)  (0.139) 
           
Constant -0.387* 2.674* -0.502** -0.931 -0.663** -1.572 -0.610** -2.688* -0.530*** -0.622 
  (0.175) (1.198) (0.187) (1.370) (0.212) (1.287) (0.188) (1.241) (0.094) (0.613) 
           
Observations 248 248 239 239 203 203 236 236 926 926 
Robust standard errors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5. The Gender Gap in Willingness to Compete in the Math Task 
Logit (marginal effects): Gender differences in the proportion of competitive choices in the math task. 
  Baseline Priming Male counterpart Female counterpart Pooled 
                      
Female -0.356 -0.201 -0.392 -0.397 -0.629* -0.491 -0.356 -0.233 -0.420** -0.318* 
 (0.292) (0.324) (0.289) (0.306) (0.304) (0.324) (0.297) (0.320) (0.147) (0.156)            
Age  -0.148*  0.042  0.014  -0.038  -0.031 
  (0.071)  (0.065)  (0.073)  (0.062)  (0.034)            
Income  0.715***  -0.014  0.257  0.361*  0.283*** 
  (0.183)  (0.131)  (0.145)  (0.146)  (0.072)            
Education  0.090  0.142  0.114  -0.229  0.081 
  (0.230)  (0.210)  (0.236)  (0.234)  (0.110)            
Age squared  0.001  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
           
Gender of the interviewer  0.494  -0.097  0.205  0.220  0.211 
  (0.303)  (0.294)  (0.320)  (0.302)  (0.150) 
           
Constant -0.840*** -0.100 -0.718*** -2.100 -0.405* -2.088 -0.828*** -0.107 -0.712*** -1.185 
  (0.187) (1.400) (0.193) (1.493) (0.205) (1.416) (0.195) (1.295) (0.097) (0.689) 
           
Observations 248 248 239 239 203 203 236 236 926 926 
Robust standard errors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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3.3 Treatment effects 
In this section, we test whether systematically modifying the decision context across the four 
treatments impact gender gaps. In Table 6 we present the results from nine regressions testing 
whether the gender gap in risk-taking and willingness to compete in the two tasks differ between 
the baseline treatment and the other treatments. All regressions include a variable for treatment 
(reducing the number of treatments to the two in the pairwise comparison), whether the 
participant is female or not, and the interaction between the two variables. In Table 6 we report 
the coefficient and standard error for the interaction variable of each regression, which measures 
the extent to which the gender gap differs between the treatments of comparison. (Full 
regressions are displayed in Table A9-A11.) In line with the regressions investigating gender 
differences within the baseline and treatments, we use OLS for number of risky choices and 
marginal effects from logit regressions for willingness to compete in the verbal and the math 
task respectively.     
 Table 6. Comparison of gender differences between baseline and the treatments  
  Baseline vs Priming   Baseline vs Male counterpart   
Baseline vs Female 
counterpart  
            
Number of risky choices 0.174  -0.194  0.102 
 (0.404)  (0.417)  (0.397)       
Competition in the verbal task 0.336  0.532  0.276 
 (0.373) (0.392) (0.378) 
      
Competition in the math task -0.036  -0.273  -0.000 
 (0.410) (0.421) (0.416) 
            
Observations 498   458   492 
Robust standard errors * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
As indicated in the table, we find no impact of the different treatments on the gender gap. 
Further, we find no impact on the behavior of men and women in general.  
3.4 Robustness 
We find no overall robust gender differences in risk taking or competitive behavior in our 
representative sample of the Swedish adult population. To evaluate our null result in terms of 
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statistical power we conduct a post power analysis. To do so, we use the R-code by Gelman 
and Carlin (2014) and the effect size from previous studies.  
Regarding risk taking we assume that the true effect size is the results from Crosetto and 
Filippin (2016), who across a large number of studies document an average gender gap 
corresponding to a Cohen´s d of 0.55 in different versions of the Eckel and Grossman task 
which is similar to the one we use in that it has a safe option. The measure of standard errors 
comes from our study (from Table 3; the baseline (column 1) and the pooled sample (column 
9)). If our study comprised only the 248 participants in the Baseline treatment, we have 53% 
power to detect this Cohen’s d of 0.55. If we use the standard errors from the pooled group, 
with a sample size of 926 participants, however, we have 96% power to detect the Cohen’s d 
of 0.55.  
When it comes to willingness to compete in the math task, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) is 
the standard reference. Using their results, we find that they have an effect size of 0.80 in terms 
of Cohen’s d (which can be considered a large effect). As with the gender gap in risk 
preferences, we use the standard errors from our study, starting with the standard error from 
our Baseline treatment (Table 5, column 1). With 248 participants our sample size is more than 
three times the sample size of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), and we have 78% power to 
detect their full effect size. With our pooled sample of 926 participants, we instead have 100% 
power (the standard error is taken from Table 5 column 9). This indicates that our results are 
not due to low power.  
As an additional robustness check, we excluded participants who did not answer the control 
questions correctly to see if this influenced the results. While the risk task did not have any 
control questions, we can identify the share of participants that has multiple switching points 
between the risky and the safe option. In our sample, a larger share of women (19%) than men 
(12%) are inconsistent (p=0.002). Dropping these observations, we still find no gender 
differences within the baseline or in any of the treatments or pooled samples (see Table A5).  
About 75 % and 79 % of all participants answered the control question about the competitive 
part in the verbal task and the math task correctly, and there are no systematic gender differences 
in number of correct answers (p=0.900 for the verbal task and p=0.594 for the math task, prtest). 
Excluding the participants who did not answer the control question correctly for each 
measurement does not impact our results in important ways (see Tables A6 and A7).  
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In this study, we conduct 21 tests (within the full sample, dependent as wells as independent 
tests). Multiple testing increases the probability of Type I errors. When designing the study, we 
did not take Bonferroni corrections into account and do not include the corrections in the text 
to avoid an increase of Type II errors. A simple Bonferroni correction of the size would imply 
approximately a p-value threshold of 0.002 (0.05/21) for statistical significance. The only test 
that survives such a correction is the gender gap in competitiveness in the math task in the 
pooled sample, when no control variables are included. Since we found few gender differences 
in our study, this correction makes little difference to the overall inference.   
 
 
4. Discussion 
To achieve greater gender equality, or increase our knowledge of gender differences in 
economic preferences, it is important to understand where gender differences come from and 
in what type of populations they occur. In this experiment on a random and representative 
sample of the Swedish adult population, we find no robust evidence of gender differences in 
risk preferences or willingness to compete in two different tasks. With respect to risk 
preferences, our result stands in contrast to many previous studies using student samples but 
corroborates two other studies using incentivized measures on representative samples in 
Denmark (Harrison et al. 2007) and Germany (Dohmen et al. 2010) respectively. To our 
knowledge, there are no previous studies of willingness to compete using a random and 
representative sample. Most studies on students find that women are less willing compete than 
men in math tasks but not necessarily verbal tasks. While we find an indication of this in our 
pooled sample, the effect size is smaller than, e.g. what Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find in 
their seminal paper.  
There may be several reasons why our findings differ from previous studies that find gender 
differences in risk and competitive preferences. One potential explanation is the specific 
country studied here: Sweden is one of the most gender equal countries in the world. However, 
previous studies do not indicate that gender gaps in preferences are necessarily smaller in more 
gender equal countries or cultures (e.g., Cárdenas et al. 2012; Khachatryan et al. 2015; Zhang 
2013; and Falk et al. 2017, but see also, e.eg, ; Gneezy et al. 2009; Andersen et al. 2013).  
Our study differs from the majority of previous studies in the sense that data collection was 
done through phone interviews. Using phone interviews to collect data may have both positive 
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and negative response effects (de Leeuw 2008). Another aspect of phone interviews is that they 
may influence anonymity. Although anonymity is arguably greater in phone interviews than in 
face to face interviews, the phone interview setting does not allow for the same degree of 
anonymity as the laboratory. While our intuition is that less anonymity would rather increase 
gender preference gaps – for example, through a concern to adhere to gender norms prescribing 
different behavior for men and women – it is, of course, possible that this setting reduces the 
size of gender preference gaps compared to laboratory experiments.  
 
The lack of a priming effect may be due to the fact that the priming occurred at the beginning 
of our study. In Boschini et al. 2018, where we explore the outcome in the Dictator Game of 
the same study, we find suggestive evidence of women in the DG giving more than men in the 
priming treatment. It is possible that any effect of the treatment had disappeared by the time the 
participants make decisions in the risk domain and whether to compete. It should, however, be 
noted that we did not have any manipulation check, and also that the priming literature has 
come under heavy critique during the last few years (see, e.g., Yong 2012).  
Another possible reason is the type of sample. The random sample used here is less selected 
than the student samples most commonly used in previous studies. As indicated above, at least 
a few studies employing representative samples also fail to find gender preference gaps in the 
risk domain, but on the other hand, other studies on Swedish representative samples have found 
gender differences in risk attitudes measured through self-reported risk-taking.  
Further, while it is possible that we are underpowered to detect true, but small sized, gender 
differences, our robustness analysis indicates that we have enough observations to detect gender 
gaps of the size that have previously been found.  
It is of course also possible that, in line with our findings, gender preference gaps in Sweden 
are small or non-existing in a representative sample, at least for these specific preferences. One 
important reason why we are interested in gender preference gaps is the previous findings 
relating gender preference gaps to labor market outcomes and economic outcomes in general. 
However, the Swedish labor market and the educational choices of Swedish youth, remain 
characterized by vertical and horizontal segregation on gender (Albrecht et al. 2003). Thus our 
results suggest that these (specific) gender gaps in the labor market should be studied through 
other lenses than that of gender differences in risk preferences and willingness to compete. To 
what extent this holds for other countries remains to be explored.  
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
Table A1. Sample sizes, non-response and under-coverage 
    Telephone Postal  
    
Sample size  2349 800 
    
Response  996 374     
Non-response    
 Declined 610 8 
 No contact 271 370 
    
Under-coverage    
 Not part of the population 89  
 No active phone 
number/address 320 37 
 Wrong sampling 56  
 Late postal responses  11 
  Older than the population 6   
 
Table A2. Phone interview: non-response analysis 
  Non-responders Responders     
  Mean SD Mean SD p-value ttest 
p-value 
KS** 
Gender 0.4915 0.50 0.4885 0.50 0.896 1 
Age 
category* 6.5142 3.0298 6.5166 3.1839 0.987 0.901 
* Age categories are; 1=18-20, 2=21-25, 3=26-30, 4=31-35, 5=36-40, 6=41-45, 7=46-50, 
8=51-55, 9=56-60, 10=61-65, 11=66-70, and 12=71-73.  Since the age for responders is 
collected as a continuous variable when comparing the figures we forced the responders actual 
age into the same categories as for non-responders. 
** We also tested the equality of distribution between the non-responders and the responders 
using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with the combined p-value for large samples. 
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Table A3. Comparing population and sample 
  Population Our sample 
 Mean Sd Mean Sd 
Gender (0=man, 
1=woman) 0.502 0.50 0.488 0.50 
Age  40.616 23.678 45.516 15.758 
     
Income Proportion Share of women Proportion 
Share of 
women 
<= 100.000 0.196 0.470 0.133 0.520 
100 001-250 000 0.315 0.392 0.277 0.576 
250 001-375 000 0.299 0.478 0.360 0.493 
375 001-500 000 0.114 0.326 0.113 0.306 
500 001-750 000 0.056 0.261 0.084 0.325 
750 001-1 000 000 0.012 0.226 0.020 0.263 
>1 000 000 0.008 0.165 0.013 0.333 
Education     
< 7 years 0.064 0.462 0.042 0.390 
8-9 years 0.119 0.433 0.110 0.422 
10-12 years 0.468 0.475 0.409 0.493 
> 12 years 0.350 0.550 0.440 0.508 
Statistics Sweden provided aggregate estimates based on individual data, from 2011 of the full 
Swedish population aged 18-73. The distribution of age is somewhat flatter and more skewed 
to the right of the mean compared to the population distribution (comparing kurtosis and 
skewness). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
27 
 
 
Table A4. Confirmed random assignment 
  Control Priming Female Counterpart 
Male 
counterpart 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
         
Gender 0.4647   0.500 0.484   0.501 0.523  0.501 0.488   0.501 
Age 45.647   15.663 46.439   15.539 44.326 15.843 45.472 16.030 
Income 
category* 2.758 1.115 2.923  1.331 2.809   1.294 2.898 1.343 
Interaction: 
gender and 
income 
category 
1.210  1.488 1.258  1.547 1.287   1.485 1.275 1.621 
Interaction: 
gender and 
age  
21.699  25.587 22.839   25.920 22.477 24.181 21.456  24.547 
*In line with regulations of statistical disclosure control from Statistics Sweden we collected 
income in categories. Income is categorized in 7 brackets of SEK; 1=<100 000, 2=101-250k, 
3=251-375k, 4=376-500k, 5=501-759k, 6=751-1000k, and 7= >1000k. 
None of the variables are significantly different between the treatments using a ttest. 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
Table A5. OLS: Gender differences in number of risky choices. Restricted to those that 
answered consistent. 
 
 Baseline   Priming   Male 
count.p 
  Female 
count.p 
  Pooled   
Female 0.133 0.210 0.364 0.514 -0.138 -0.180 0.083 0.178 0.116 0.181 
 (0.317) (0.320) (0.349) (0.359) (0.350) (0.347) (0.334) (0.351) (0.169) (0.173) 
Age  -0.015  0.225**  0.168*  0.046  0.098* 
  (0.076)  (0.084)  (0.079)  (0.074)  (0.038) 
Income  0.307*  0.206  0.036  0.105  0.165* 
  (0.138)  (0.153)  (0.158)  (0.130)  (0.072) 
Education  0.092  -0.117  -0.257  -0.347  -0.154 
  (0.237)  (0.255)  (0.272)  (0.291)  (0.131) 
Age squared  -0.000  -0.003**  -0.002*  -0.001  -0.001** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Gender of the 
interviewer 
 -0.500  -0.358  -0.660  -0.389  -0.462** 
  (0.319)  (0.344)  (0.361)  (0.331)  (0.166) 
Constant 3.474*** 3.212* 3.057*** -1.218 3.793*** 1.609 3.577*** 3.573* 3.467*** 1.981** 
 (0.200) (1.335) (0.228) (1.716) (0.225) (1.577) (0.220) (1.407) (0.109) (0.740) 
Adj. R2 -0.004 0.026 0.001 0.068 -0.005 0.017 -0.005 -0.011 -0.001 0.029 
Obs. 205 205 200 200 182 182 199 199 786 786 
Robust standard errors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A6. Logit (marginal effects): Gender differences in proportion of competitive 
choices in the verbal task. Restricted to those that answered the control questions 
correctly. 
  Baseline Priming Male counterpart Female counterpart Pooled 
Female -0.169 -0.037 0.113 0.158 0.286 0.330 0.154 0.203 0.088 0.144 
 (0.307) (0.327) (0.303) (0.321) (0.335) (0.358) (0.310) (0.350) (0.156) (0.163) 
Age  -0.242** 
 -0.042  -0.030  0.030  -0.060 
  (0.078)  (0.075)  (0.077)  (0.068)  (0.036) 
Income  0.493**  0.074  -0.046  0.184  0.151* 
  (0.165)  (0.149)  (0.161)  (0.152)  (0.074) 
Education  0.024  0.213  0.568*  0.251  0.231 
  (0.258)  (0.219)  (0.269)  (0.282)  (0.123) 
Age squared  0.002**  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Gender of 
the 
interviewer 
 0.314  -0.072  0.211  0.178  0.125 
  (0.322)  (0.311)  (0.347)  (0.321)  (0.158) 
Constant -0.423* 3.222* -0.575** -0.504 -0.636** -2.071 -0.470* -2.696 -0.521*** -0.522 
  (0.209) (1.413) (0.209) (1.609) (0.239) (1.501) (0.216) (1.439) (0.108) (0.714) 
Obs. 183 183 188 188 153 153 174 174 698 698 
Robust standard errors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A7. Logit (marginal effects): Gender differences in proportion of competitive 
choices in the math task. Restricted to those that answered the control questions 
correctly. 
  Baseline Priming Male counterpart Female counterpart Pooled 
Female -0.499 -0.257 -0.631 -0.704* -0.915** -0.742* -0.368 -0.222 -0.591*** -0.492** 
 (0.339) (0.383) (0.328) (0.343) (0.347) (0.366) (0.333) (0.369) (0.168) (0.176) 
Age  -0.145  0.080  -0.004  -0.039  -0.029 
  (0.087)  (0.076)  (0.082)  (0.074)  (0.038) 
Income  0.624**  -0.109  0.307  0.349*  0.259** 
  (0.204)  (0.151)  (0.162)  (0.172)  (0.081) 
Education  -0.053  0.168  0.036  -0.165  0.048 
  (0.302)  (0.249)  (0.259)  (0.274)  (0.128) 
Age squared  0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Gender of the 
interviewer 
 0.446  0.081  0.173  0.233  0.226 
  (0.350)  (0.331)  (0.358)  (0.337)  (0.167) 
Constant -0.833*** 0.896 -0.664** -2.530 -0.251 -1.547 -0.811*** -0.287 -0.655*** -0.901 
  (0.219) (1.671) (0.209) (1.745) (0.226) (1.606) (0.213) (1.573) (0.107) (0.786) 
Obs. 190 190 196 196 160 160 189 189 735 735 
Robust standard errors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A8. Socio-economic variables correlated with number of risky choices and 
willingness to compete for women and men. 
  
 Risky choices Competitive choices 
verbal task 
Competitive choices math 
task 
 Females Males Females Males Females Males 
       
Age 0.104* 0.039 -0.013 -0.078 -0.011 -0.038 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.052) (0.044) 
Income 0.310** 0.094 0.270** 0.107 0.430*** 0.177* 
 (0.107) (0.084) (0.099) (0.086) (0.116) (0.088) 
Education -0.235 -0.127 0.101 0.234 -0.271 0.320* 
 (0.178) (0.143) (0.151) (0.131) (0.163) (0.148) 
Age squared -0.001* -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Gender of the 
interviewer 
-0.331 -0.379 0.038 0.168 -0.192 0.551** 
 (0.216) (0.200) (0.202) (0.194) (0.234) (0.200) 
Constant 1.843* 3.154*** -1.200 0.014 -0.940 -1.678 
 (0.921) (0.884) (0.877) (0.854) (1.094) (0.892) 
Adj. R2 0.044 0.005 - - - - 
Obs. 443 483 443 483 443 483 
Robust standard errors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A9. OLS: Gender differences in number of risky choices between baseline and 
treatments. 
  Baseline vs. Priming Baseline vs. Male counterpart 
Baseline vs. Female 
counterpart 
Treatment -0.491 0.189 -0.061 
 (0.270) (0.276) (0.268) 
Female 0.026 0.026 0.026 
 (0.271) (0.271) (0.271) 
Treatment x Gender 0.174 -0.194 0.102 
 (0.404) (0.417) (0.397) 
Constant 3.581*** 3.581*** 3.581*** 
  (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) 
Adj. R2 0.003 -0.006 -0.006 
Obs. 487 451 484 
Robust standard errors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A10. Logit (marginal effects): Gender differences in proportion of competitive 
choices in the verbal task between baseline and treatments. 
  Baseline vs. Priming Baseline vs. Male counterpart 
Baseline vs. Female 
counterpart 
Treatment -0.115 -0.276 -0.223 
 (0.256) (0.274) (0.256) 
Female -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 
 (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) 
Treatment x Gender 0.336 0.532 0.276 
 (0.373) (0.392) (0.378) 
Constant -0.387* -0.387* -0.387* 
  (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) 
Obs. 487 451 484 
Robust standard errors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A11. Logit (marginal effects): Gender differences in proportion of competitive 
choices in the math task between baseline and treatments. 
  Baseline vs. Priming Baseline vs. Male counterpart 
Baseline vs. Female 
counterpart 
Treatment 0.122 0.435 0.012 
 (0.269) (0.277) (0.270) 
Female -0.356 -0.356 -0.356 
 (0.292) (0.292) (0.292) 
Treatment x Gender -0.036 -0.273 -0.000 
 (0.410) (0.421) (0.416) 
Constant -0.840*** -0.840*** -0.840*** 
  (0.187) (0.187) (0.187) 
Obs. 487 451 484 
Robust standard errors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix B: Telephone instructions in English (read by an interviewer) 
 
Hello, 
 
I’m calling on behalf of Stockholm University. We previously sent you a letter with information about 
a research study on financial decision-making. I hope you’ve had the opportunity to read through it 
and that you’re willing to take part in our study. 
 
[Wait for Yes/No; if No, read out a summary of the letter]  
 
Thank you for taking part in this study! 
 
Our research study looks at financial decisions relating to how money is distributed among different 
individuals. The money is real, and depending on what decisions you and other participants in the 
study make, you can earn some. How this works will become clearer as I describe the various 
decisions, you’ll be required to make. 
 
You will receive 100 crowns for taking part, over and above whatever money you receive for one of 
your decisions. 
 
In the course of this interview, you’ll take a position on 8 different kinds of decisions – what we call 
decision situations. Now there’s no such thing as a “correct decision” – rather, it’s a matter of which 
decision you decide to make in a given situation. As the interviewer, I’m not allowed to advise you or 
help you with your decisions. A number of them concern the distribution of money between you and 
another participant in the study. You and the other party are unknown to one another, and neither of 
you gets to know who the other is. The other party is a new person each time. The 8 decision situations 
are independent of one another, and you can think of them as eight separate situations. 
 
You’ll be paid for one of the 8 decision situations. If you collaborate with a second party on that 
decision, that person will also be paid. In a letter that will be sent out on completion of the study, 
you’ll be told which decision you are being paid for and how you’re to go about arranging payment. 
Which decision your payment is based on is not influenced by what you decide. All decisions are 
equally common as a basis for payment. The interview takes about 25 minutes. 
 
Please feel free to ask questions if anything is unclear. 
 
Before each of the different decisions, you’ll be asked to answer some check questions, so that we 
know our explanations are clear to all participants. 
 
Before we begin, we’d like you to have a pen and paper in front of you. [if necessary, wait while the 
participant fetches pen and paper] 
 
[The following question is asked before the interview only in the priming treatment, otherwise at the 
end of the interview:]  
 
Before we start the interview, I’m required to ask you a check question – are you a woman or a man? 
 _ Woman _Man 
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Decision 1 
 
For this decision, you are paired anonymously with another participant/man/woman from the study. 
 
In this part, you get 400 crowns, and the other person gets nothing. You are the only decision-maker in 
this part, so the other person has no decision to make. You can choose to give away money to the other 
person. The question we will ask you is how much of the 400 crowns you keep yourself and how 
much you give the other person. 
 
Before you make your choice, we have a couple of check questions.  
 
1. If you choose to keep 200 crowns, how much does the other person get? 
2. If you choose to keep nothing, how much will the other person get?  
 
It’s now time for you to choose. 
How much of the 400 crowns do you keep and how much does the [person/man/woman] you are 
paired with get? 
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Decision 2 
 
In this part, you are paired anonymously with another [male/female] participant from the study, and 
both you and the other person are decision-makers. To the [other participant/him/her], you are another 
anonymous participant. 
 
The other party has 400 crowns and must decide how to divide this money between the two of you. 
You can say Yes or No to the proposed split. If you say Yes, the money will be divided between you 
as proposed by the other party. If you say No, neither of you will get any money. You will not be told 
what the other party has proposed. Instead, we now want you to decide the minimum sum you would 
say Yes to if the 400 crowns are divided between you. This means that you say No to any kind of split 
that gives you less than this sum. Should you say No, neither you nor the other person will get any 
money in this part. 
 
In other words, you say Yes or No to the other party’s proposal as to how the 400 crowns is to be 
divided between the two of you. If you say Yes, both of you will get money in accordance with the 
proposal; if you say No, neither of you will get any money. 
 
Before you make your choice we have a couple of check questions. 
 
Imagine that the other party proposes keeping 300 crowns, which means you get 100 crowns.  
 
1. What happens if you’ve said the minimum sum you would agree to is 200 crowns? 
2. What happens if you’ve said the minimum sum you would agree to is 10 crowns? 
 
It’s now time for you to decide. 
So – the [person/man/woman] you are paired with can divide the money between the two of you. 
What is the minimum sum you would agree to in such a split? 
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Decision 3 
 
[Interviewer, please note: This part is slightly more complicated, and you may have to read it out 
twice] 
 
In this part, you are paired anonymously with another [male/female] participant in the study. Here, 
both you and the other person are decision-makers. The economic decision we now want to study is 
the following: You are to choose one of two alternatives, A or B. The other person will also be 
choosing one of these two alternatives. Depending on what choices you and the other person make, 
you will get different sums of money. You don’t know beforehand which alternative the other person 
chooses, and the other person doesn’t know beforehand which alternative you choose. 
 
I want you to write down the alternatives I’ll now read out to you. 
 
If you choose A, the other person gets 300 crowns. 
If you choose B, you and the other person get 100 crowns each. 
 
In the same way, the other person chooses between the same two alternatives. 
 
This means: 
 
If both of you choose A, you get 300 crowns, and the other person gets 300 crowns. 
 
If you choose A and the other person chooses B, you get 100 crowns, and the other person gets 400 
crowns. 
 
If you choose B and the other person chooses A, you get 400 crowns, and the other person gets 100 
crowns. 
 
If both of you choose B, you get 200 crowns, and the other person gets 200 crowns. 
 
Before you make your choice, we have a few check questions for you. Have you written down the 
alternatives? [wait for the answer] 
 
1. If both of you choose A, how much do you get and how much does the other person get? 
2. If you choose A and the other person chooses B, how much do you get and how much does the 
other person get? 
3. If you choose B and the other person chooses A, how much do you get and how much does the 
other person get? 
4. If both of you choose B, how much do you get and how much does the [person/man/woman] 
you have been paired with get? 
It’s now time for you to decide. 
Do you choose alternative A or alternative B? 
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Decision 4 
 
[Interviewer, please note: This part is slightly more complicated, and you may have to read it out 
twice] 
 
If you like, you can write down the alternatives I’m going to read out to you soon. 
Here, you’re paired with an anonymous [male/female] participant from this study. Both you and the 
other person are decision-makers. You are initially given a sum of money, while the other person 
initially has no money at all. This part is in two stages. 
 
In the first stage, you choose between three alternatives: keep all the money you’ve got, send half to 
the other party, or send all the money to the other party. Whatever you send will be tripled, so the 
other person will get three times the sum you’ve sent. In the second stage, the other party chooses 
whether to send money back to you.  
 
If you keep all the money, you get everything, and the other party gets nothing. If you give away half, 
you keep the other half plus that part of the tripled sum that the other person sends back to you. If you 
give away all the money, you get what the other person sends back. The other person gets whatever 
he/she keeps of the tripled sum. So you have three alternatives: 1. Keep the money. 2. Give away half 
the money. 3. Give away all the money. 
 
Before you make your choice, we have a few check questions.  
 
For this decision, you have 100 crowns. 
 
1. How much money do you get and how much does the other party get if you decide to keep the 
100 crowns?  
2. How much money does the other party have for distribution if you send 50 crowns? 
3. How much money do you get if you send 100 crowns to the [person/man/woman] you are 
paired with, and [that person/he/she] decides to send back half? 
 
Now it’s soon time for you to choose.  
 
You have the sum of 100 crowns. Which alternative do you choose: to keep the 100 crowns, to give 
away 50 crowns or to give away 100 crowns? 
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Decision 5 
 
In this part, you are paired anonymously with another [male/female] participant in the study. The 
economic decision we now want to deal with is the following: Both you and the other person are to 
choose one of two alternatives, A or B. Depending on how you both choose, you will get different 
sums of money. You earn more if you both choose A, the other person earns most if you both choose 
B. However, both of you earn the least amount of money if you choose different alternatives. You 
don’t know beforehand which alternative the other person chooses, and the other person doesn’t know 
beforehand which alternative you choose. 
 
I want you to write down the alternatives I’ll now read out to you. 
 
Alternative A gives you 300 crowns and the other person 150 crowns if you both choose alternative A. 
 
Alternative B gives you 150 crowns and the other person 300 crowns if you both choose alternative B. 
 
If one of you chooses alternative A and the other person chooses alternative B, you each get 50 
crowns. 
 
So: 
If both of you choose A, you yourself get 300 crowns, and the other person gets 150 crowns. 
 
If both choose B, it will be the other way round - you yourself get 150 crowns, and the other 
person gets 300 crowns. 
 
If you choose A and the other person chooses B, you get 50 crowns each. 
 
If you choose B and the other person chooses A, you also get 50 crowns each.  
 
Before you make your choice, we have a few check questions. Have you written down the 
alternatives? [wait for the answer] 
 
1. If both of you choose A, how much do you get and how much does the other person get? 
2. If you choose A and the other person chooses B, how much do you get and how much does the 
other person get? 
3. If you choose B and the other person chooses A, how much do you get and how much does the 
other person get? 
4. If both of you choose B, how much do you get and how much does the [person/man/woman] 
you have been paired with get? 
 
It’s now time for you to decide.  
Do you want to choose:  
alternative A 
(If both choose A, you yourself get 300 crowns, and the other person gets 150 crowns, and if the two 
of you make different choices you both get 50 crowns) 
 
or  
 
alternative B  
(If both choose B, you yourself get 150 crowns, and the other person gets 300 crowns, and if the two 
of you make different choices you both get 50 crowns)  
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Decision 6  
 
In this part, you will NOT be paired with another participant. You are the only decision-maker, and 
there is no other party. In this part, you’ll be presented with seven choices. In each of them, you 
choose between getting a certain sum of money for sure or tossing a coin to win either 200 crowns 
(heads) or nothing at all (tails). 
 
Should this part become the basis for your financial remuneration, payment will be based on one of the 
seven choices/alternatives below (which one it will be has nothing to do with how you reply). If in that 
alternative, you chose money for sure, you get that money. If you chose coin-tossing, we will toss a 
coin to arrive at a decision. 
 
a) Which alternative do you choose: 
______40 crowns 
______the toss of a coin to either win 200 crowns or get nothing at all  
 
b) Which alternative do you choose: 
______60 crowns 
______the toss of a coin to either win 200 crowns or get nothing at all  
 
c) Which alternative do you choose: 
______80 crowns 
______the toss of a coin  
 
d) Which alternative do you choose: 
______100 crowns 
______the toss of a coin  
 
e) Which alternative do you choose: 
______120 crowns 
______the toss of a coin  
 
f) Which alternative do you choose: 
______140 crowns 
______the toss of a coin  
 
g) Which alternative do you choose: 
______160 crowns 
______the toss of a coin  
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Decision 7  
 
This is the second to last decision situation. 
 
In this part, you are paired anonymously with another [male/female] participant in the study. It’s 
important that you have a pen and paper for this. The economic decision we now want to look at is the 
following: Both you and the other person will each be given the same series of 7 letters, and over a 
period of 2 minutes you will compose words of at least 3 letters each. You’ll be paid for the number of 
words you compose, however long they may be. 
 
Here’s an example by way of illustration. I will now read out a series of 7 letters. To make it easier to 
understand, it’s a good idea to write down this example: ABCDEFG. These letters may only be used 
once in each word. In this series, there are many words containing at least 3 letters, e.g. BAD, FED, 
DAB, AGE etc. Your task is to compose as many words as possible. As to which words are permitted, 
ordinary “Scrabble rules” apply. This means, for instance, no conjugations, no names, no 
abbreviations and no compound words. The words you use must be listed in a reputable dictionary 
such as Collins or the Oxford English.  
 
Before you begin, you must choose how you want to be paid. This can be done in two different ways. 
Under Payment Method 1, you get 10 crowns for every correct word you compose, regardless of how 
many words the other person puts together. Under Payment Method 2, your result will be compared to 
the other person’s result. If you compose more words than the other person, you get 20 crowns per 
correct word. Otherwise you get nothing. If it’s a draw, you both get 20 crowns per correct word. Do 
you have any questions before we set about this task? 
 
Before you make your choice, we have a few check questions. 
 
1. How much will you get paid per word if you choose Payment Method 1? 
2. How much will you get paid per word if you choose Payment Method 2 and you compose more 
words than the person you are paired with? 
3. How much will you get paid per word if you choose Payment Method 2 and you compose fewer 
words than the person you are paired with? 
4. How much will you get paid per word if you choose Payment Method 2 and you compose the same 
number of words as the [person/man/woman] you are paired with? 
 
After you’ve made your choice, I’ll read out the series of 7 letters that you’re to compose words from. 
Once I’ve read out the letters, the 2 minutes you have in which to perform the task will begin. You 
have to read out the words during these 2 minutes, and the words must contain at least 3 letters. When 
2 minutes have passed, no more answers will be accepted. 
 
Before I read out the series of letters, you have to decide about payment.  
 
Which payment method do you choose: individual payment, in other words, 10 crowns for sure for 
each word you compose, or competition, which means you get 20 crowns per word if you compose 
more words than the other party?  
 
[Respondents who say they do not want to compete are given the proposal about individual payment]  
 
Please write down the series of letters that I’m now going to read out. 
 
SERIES OF LETTERS: (A) Adam, (E) Edward, (I) for India, (K) King, (R) Robert, (S) Stephen, (V)  
Victory, (T) Tango.  
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You now have 2 minutes in which to compose words and read them out to me.  
 
[2 min] 
 
Your 2 minutes are now at an end so you can’t read out any more words. 
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Decision 8  
 
The final part. 
 
In this part, you are paired anonymously with another [male/female] participant in the study. It’s 
important that you have a pen and paper for this. Over a period of 2 minutes, both you and the other 
person will now solve maths sums. You’ll be paid for the number of sums you solve. 
 
Here is an example by way of illustration. I’m going to read out a series of nine numbers. To make it 
easier to understand, it’s a good idea to write this example down. 102141563. 
 
Based on these nine numbers, you’re to find as many combinations as possible that add up to 25. In 
the series, I’ve given you there are many numbers that add up to 25, for instance, 10+15=25, 24+1=25, 
4+6+15=25. Each number in the series may only be used once for each combination. In other words, 
the number one appears twice in the series so you cannot use a one more than twice in your 
combination. 10 + 14 + 1 also makes 25, for instance, but that would not be accepted. Your task is to 
find as many combinations as possible. 
 
Before you begin, you’re to choose the payment method you prefer. You can be paid in two different 
ways. Under Payment Method 1, you get 10 crowns for every correct combination you find that adds 
up to 25, regardless of how many combinations the other party finds. Under Payment Method 2, your 
result will be compared to the other person’s result. If you find more combinations than the other 
person, you get 20 crowns per correct combination. Otherwise, you get nothing. If it’s a draw, you 
both get 20 crowns per correct combination. Do you have any questions before we begin this task? 
 
Before you make your choice we have a few check questions: 
 
1. How much will you get paid per combination if you choose Payment Method 1? 
2. How much will be paid per combination if you choose Payment Method 2 and you find more 
combinations than the other person? 
3. How much will you get paid per combination if you choose Payment Method 2 and you find fewer 
combinations than the person you are paired with? 
4. How much will you get paid per combination if you choose Payment Method 2 and you find the 
same number of combinations as the [person/man/woman] you are paired with? 
 
After you’ve made your choice, I’ll read out the series of numbers that you’re to use to find 
combinations that add up to 25. Once I’ve read out this series of numbers, the 2 minutes you have in 
which to perform the task will begin. You must read out your combinations during the 2 minutes. 
When 2 minutes have passed, no more answers will be accepted. 
 
Before I read out the series of numbers, you have to decide about payment.  
 
Which payment method do you choose: individual payment, in other words, 10 crowns for sure for 
each combination of numbers you find, or competition, which means you get 20 crowns per 
combination if you find more than the other party, otherwise nothing?  
 
So your task is to find combinations of numbers that add up to 25. Please write down the series of 
numbers that I’m now going to read out. 
 
SERIES OF NUMBERS: 519326142 
 
You now have 2 minutes in which to put together combinations that add up to 25 and to read them out 
to me.  
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[2 min] 
 
Your 2 minutes are now at an end so you can’t read out any more combinations. 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
Concluding questions 
 
We’d now like to conclude this study by asking you a few standard questions. 
 
Before we start, I’m required to ask you a check question – are you a woman or a man? 
 
_ Woman  
_Man 
Do not know Int: Do not read this option! 
 
What is your marital status? 
Married 
Cohabitant  
Single 
Other 
Do not know/Refuse to give an answer Int: Do not read this option! 
 
How many children under 18 do you have? 
None 
1 
2 
3 
More than 3 
Do not know/Refuse to give an answer Int: Do not read this option! 
 
What year were you born? 
Four figures 
 
What is your household income per annum before tax (SEK)? 
< 100.000 kr 
101.000 – 250.000 kr 
251.000 – 375.000 kr 
376.000 – 500.000 kr 
501.000 – 750.000 kr 
751.000 – 1.000.000 kr 
> 1.000.000 kr 
Do not know/Refuse to give an answer Int: Do not read this option! 
 
What is your income per annum before tax (SEK)? 
< 100.000 kr 
101.000 – 250.000 kr 
251.000 – 375.000 kr 
376.000 – 500.000 kr 
501.000 – 750.000 kr 
751.000 – 1.000.000 kr 
> 1.000.000 kr 
Do not know/Refuse to give an answer Int: Do not read this option! 
 
We’d also like to know what is the highest level of education you’ve completed?  
Compulsory school (maximum 7 years of schooling) 
Upper secondary school (8-9 years of schooling) 
Vocational college / Folk high school (10-12 years of schooling) 
University/University college without formal degree 
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University/University college with formal degree 
University/University college without formal degree 
Studying part time 
Studying full time 
Do not know/Refuse to give an answer Int: Do not read this option! 
 
What is your principal occupation? 
Self-employed 
Employee 
Student 
Pensioner 
Unemployed 
Military service 
Other occupation 
Do not know Int: Do not read this option! 
 
Do you work for/in…? 
The public sector (state, municipal, county council) 
A state, municipal or county council company (wholly owned) 
A state/municipal and private company (mixed ownership) 
A private company 
An organisation (NGO, an advocacy group, trade union etc.) 
Do not know Int: Do not read this option! 
 
 
What position do you hold at work? 
 
Salaried employee/Office worker 
Staff officer 
Senior manager 
Expert 
Another type of employee 
Other 
Do not know Int: Do not read this option! 
 
 
 
 
We’re very grateful to you for taking part in this study on economic decision-making. In a few weeks’ 
time, you’ll receive a letter from us showing how much you’re to be paid and how you’re to contact 
Stockholm University so that the money can be paid out to you. That letter will also tell you how you 
can find out about the results of the study. In time, those results will be presented in one or more 
research reports. It will also be possible to access preliminary conclusions from the study on a website 
from the beginning of next year. 
 
 
 
